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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A RESENTENCING GAME
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Brinson1
(decided June 26, 2013)
Two defendants, in unrelated cases, claimed that resentencing
to include the mandatory post-release supervision to their determinate
sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 The defendants claimed that their multiple sentences must be
measured separately from one another.3 Therefore, at the time of resentencing, the defendants stated that they had “an expectation of finality” because they completed the determinate portion of their sentences that were subject to post-release supervision.4 The New York
Court of Appeals held that the defendants did not have a legitimate
expectation of finality until their aggregated sentences were completed and, until then, resentencing in order to correct an illegal sentence
did not violate the “Double Jeopardy Clause and the prohibition
against ‘multiple punishments.’ ”5
I.

BACKGROUND

On July 14, 2000, Christopher Brinson was sentenced to a determinate term of ten years for robbery in the second degree, an indeterminate term of three to six years for robbery in the third degree,
and another indeterminate term of two to four years for grand larceny
in the fourth degree.6 The court ordered that the indeterminate terms
to run concurrently, but the indeterminate terms to run consecutive to
the determinate term.7 Brinson was incarcerated for eleven years and
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

995 N.E.2d 144 (N.Y. 2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 145.
Id.
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four months when he was resentenced to include five years of postrelease supervision with his determinate sentence.8
In 2004, Lawrence Blankymsee was sentenced to a determinate term of five years on two counts of possession of a loaded firearm, an indeterminate sentence of three to six years on other weapons
possession counts, an indeterminate sentence of eight to sixteen years
on two felony possessions of a controlled substance counts, and a determinate sentence of one year on a misdemeanor drug possession
count.9 Blankymsee was resentenced after six years and five months
in order to impose five years post-release supervision for his determinate sentences.10
Under New York Penal Law § 70.45, a determinate sentence
not only includes a term of imprisonment, but it also imposes a period of post-release supervision to follow.11 The statute, which was
part of Jenna’s Law, was adopted by the New York Legislature in
1998 with the intent to “abolish parole and institute determinate terms
of imprisonment for certain felony offenses.”12 The New York Court
of Appeals held that post-release supervision must be properly pronounced by the sentencing court and a failure to do so “results in an
illegal sentence.”13 Additionally, these illegal sentences cannot be
administratively corrected by the Department of Correctional Service
(“DOCS”) because it is outside of the department’s jurisdiction and
only a sentencing judge may impose post-release supervision.14 In
2008, the Legislature enacted Correction Law § 601-d to be used as a
device for the court to consider resentencing defendants who were
serving determinate sentences but did not receive post-release supervision in their original sentence.15 Additionally, this law was enacted
to allow the DOCS to notify sentencing courts that post-release supervision was not included in the original sentence and that the defendant should be resentenced to include post-release supervision.16
In People v. Brinson, Brinson and Blankymsee challenged the
8

995 N.E.2d at 145-46.
Id. at 146.
10
Id.
11
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (McKinney 2011).
12
People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 881 (N.Y. 2010).
13
Id.
14
Matter of Garner v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 889 N.E.2d 467, 469-70
(N.Y. 2008).
15
Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 881.
16
Id. at 884.
9

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/14

2

Cicciaro: Double Jeopardy: A Resentencing Game

2014]

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A RESENTENCING GAME

1123

constitutionality of resentencing that imposed post-release supervision to their determinate sentences as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.17 The defendants asserted that
they had an expectation of finality because they had completed their
determinate sentences at the time of resentencing and, thus, the resentencing violated the prohibition against multiple punishments.18
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the resentencing did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendants did not have a “legitimate expectation of finality until they
completed their aggregate sentences.”19 The court stated, the “defendants were resentenced because the sentencing court failed to impose P[ost] R[elease] S[upervision] as part of the original sentence,”20 and courts have an inherent authority to correct illegal
sentences.21 Under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.40, a
court may set aside an illegal sentence and resentence the defendant.22 The time limit to resentence is reached when a defendant has
completed the sentence and an appeal, or the time to appeal, has run
out.23
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that their indeterminate and determinate sentences must be considered separately.24
The court found that under Penal Law § 70.30, consecutive and concurrent sentences are aggregated and “thus made into one.”25 Additionally, the court stated, “a legitimate expectation of finality turns on
the completion of a sentence. Where multiple sentences are properly
aggregated into a single sentence, that expectation arises upon completion of that sentence.”26 Therefore, the defendants could not have
had a legitimate expectation of finality because they were still incarcerated and serving their aggregate sentences.27 The court stated that
17

Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 144.
Id. at 145.
19
Id.
20
Id. (citing People v. Sparber, 889 N.E.2d 459, 464-65 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that a judge
must pronounce a defendant’s PRS sentence in open court and a court’s failure to impose
PRS as part of the original sentence requires resentencing of the defendant to correct the error)).
21
Id. at 146 (citing People v. Richardson, 799 N.E.2d 607, 610-11 (N.Y. 2003)).
22
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 440.40 (McKinney 1970).
23
Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 146.
24
Id. at 147.
25
Id. (citing People v. Buss, 900 N.E.2d 964, 966 (N.Y. 2008)).
26
Id. at 148.
27
Id.
18
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it must presume that the defendants knew their determinate sentences
were illegal and that they understood their multiple sentences were
subject to aggregation.28
The court discussed the case People v. Lingle.29 In Lingle, the
defendants believed that they had a legitimate expectation of finality
because they served a “substantial” portion of their original sentences.30 The court in Lingle rejected the defendants’ arguments and held
that defendants cannot create a legitimate expectation of finality if
they have served any time less than the entire sentence. 31 Furthermore, “defendants are ‘presumed to be aware that a determinate prison sentence without a term of PRS is illegal’ and subject to correction, and therefore, ‘cannot claim a legitimate expectation that the
originally-imposed, improper sentence is final for all purposes.’ ”32
The court in Brinson also referred to People v. Williams33 in
its decision. The five defendants in Williams received determinate
sentences, completed their incarceration, and were released.34 They
were then resentenced to impose terms of post-release supervision.35
The New York Court of Appeals in Williams stated that the prohibition against multiple punishments “prevents a sentence from being
increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality
of the sentence.”36 Moreover, there is a time limit when correcting an
illegal sentence.37 The court stated in Williams, “there must be a
temporal limitation on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant.”38
The court held that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, expectation of
finality occurs when the defendant completes the sentence and has
been released from custody.39 Therefore, the court could not impose
the post-release supervision on the defendants in Williams, as they
had already been released.40
28

Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 147; see People v. Lingle, 949 N.E.2d 952 (N.Y. 2011) (stating
that the defendants are charged with knowledge of the law).
29
949 N.E.2d 952 (N.Y. 2011).
30
Id. at 955.
31
Id. at 956-57.
32
Id. at 955-56.
33
925 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 2010).
34
Id. at 886.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 888 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135-36 (1980)).
37
Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 146.
38
Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 890.
39
Id. at 891.
40
Id.
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FEDERAL APPROACH
A.

Supreme Court

In United States v. Bozza,41 the Court addressed the resentencing issue under the Double Jeopardy Clause.42 The defendant’s conviction consisted of fines and imprisonment.43 However, when the
sentence was announced, the trial judge only mentioned imprisonment.44 Five hours later, the judge recalled the defendant and advised
him that the judge failed to impose mandatory fines, and he was,
therefore, including them at that time for the record.45 The Court
stated that just because the defendant was before the judge twice in
one day for sentencing, Double Jeopardy was not invoked.46 The defendant argued that the trial court cannot correct the sentence because
it would increase his punishment.47 The Court held that when a defendant is convicted based on a verdict, the defendant should not be
able to escape punishment because the trial court committed an error
during sentencing.48 Additionally, the Court recognized that “[t]he
Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in
which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.”49 The Court was only doing what the law required upon conviction, and it “ ‘set aside what it had no authority to do.’ ”50 The Court
held that the defendant was not put in jeopardy two times for the
same offense because the corrected sentence “impose[d] a valid punishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense.”51
In 1980, United States v. DiFrancesco52 was decided. In this
case, the defendant was sentenced to eight years for damaging federal
property and five years for conspiracy, which were to be served con-

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

330 U.S. 160 (1947).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 167.
Bozza, 330 U.S. at 167.
449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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currently, as well as one year for unlawful storage, which was to be
served consecutively with the other sentences.53 The defendant was
sentenced a month later to two ten year terms for racketeering; those
terms were to be served concurrently to each other, as well as with
the previous sentences, thus, resulting in only a one year addition to
the previous sentences.54 The United States appealed, challenging the
District Court’s decision to only impose one additional year onto the
defendant’s sentence as an abuse of discretion.55 The issue before the
Court was whether the announcement of a sentence created finality
and conclusiveness.56 The Court found, “[D]ouble [J]eopardy considerations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit review of a sentence.”57 The Court reasoned that the purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent multiple attempts to convict.58 Additionally, the defendant had no expectation of finality until
the appeal was completed or the time to appeal had run out.59
DiFrancesco provided that resentencing was not limited to the
facts of Bozza, where resentencing occurred on the same day as the
original sentencing, in order to correct the sentence.60 The court in
DiFrancesco expanded Bozza by holding that “[t]he Double Jeopardy
Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any
specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will
turn out to be.”61
B.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

The Second Circuit addressed the issue of expectation of finality in King v. Cuomo.62 In King, twenty-eight defendants were
sentenced to determinate terms of imprisonment but post-release supervision was not imposed during sentencing.63 The court held that
there was no reasonable expectation of finality until the defendants
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 122.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 132.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id.
King v. Cuomo, 465 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 43.
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had “completed their determinate terms and been released from custody.”64
In Williams v. Travis,65 the defendant pled guilty to burglary
in the second degree and he was sentenced to a three and a half to
seven year term of imprisonment.66 However, the sentence was illegal because the maximum sentence was double the minimum.67 The
defendant claimed that the resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause.68 The court held that the defendant did not have a legitimate
expectation of finality because his original sentence was illegal, and
thus, the defendant’s Double Jeopardy rights were not violated.69
Furthermore, a legitimate expectation of finality could not be
achieved because there was still a right to appeal.70
The Second Circuit also discussed the correction of illegal
sentences in United States ex rel. Ferrari v. Henderson.71 The defendant was sentenced to a five to fifteen year term of imprisonment,
as a second felony offender, and a fifteen to thirty year term for first
degree burglary.72 The sentence was suspended on the remaining two
counts.73 The prosecutor moved for resentencing on the grounds that
the indictment was illegal because a conviction for a felony committed with a weapon may not be suspended.74 The defendant argued
that his resentencing violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.75 The
court held that there was no “[D]ouble [J]eopardy problem here since
the correction of an illegal sentence by the imposition of a legal sentence, even when this increases punishment, cannot be considered as
multiple punishment for the same offense.”76

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 45.
143 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Travis, 143 F.3d at 99.
474 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 513.
Henderson, 474 F.2d at 513.
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Other Circuit Court of Appeals

Although the case of United States v. Welch77 is not binding
on the Second Circuit, it does have persuasive value. The defendant
was convicted and sentenced on four counts of possession of stolen
mail.78 He was sentenced to four years imprisonment on count one,
to run consecutively with three year terms for counts two, three and
four which were to run concurrent with each other.79 On appeal, the
defendant’s sentence was modified to one conviction and remanded
for resentencing.80 Then, the defendant was resentenced to five years
imprisonment.81 The defendant claimed that his Double Jeopardy
rights were violated when the court imposed a sentence that was larger than the maximum imposed for a single count at the initial sentencing.82 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant did
not have a legitimate expectation of finality because his original sentence was illegal.83 Therefore, the defendant’s Double Jeopardy
rights were not violated.84
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provides persuasive authority in United States v. Warner.85 At sentencing, the
court failed to impose a special parole term that was required “whenever a defendant with a prior conviction is sentenced to a term of imprisonment.”86 The court held that there was no Double Jeopardy
claim because an amended sentence adding a mandatory parole term
is not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.87
D.

United States District Courts

In Johnson v. New York,88 the defendant was sentenced in
1999 to a term of five and a half to eleven years for criminal possession of a controlled substance and a one year term for resisting arrest,
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

928 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 915.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916.
Welch, 928 F.2d at 916.
Id. at 917.
Id.
690 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 555.
Id.
851 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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which were to run concurrently.89 Additionally, the defendant had a
prior undischarged sentence for a parole violation of twenty-four
months, but the court did not specify whether this sentence was to run
concurrently or consecutively.90 The DOCS administered the defendant’s 1999 sentence to run concurrently with the undischarged
sentence.91 However, the initial calculation of the DOCS was invalid
because, according to the statute, the defendant’s 1999 sentence was
required to run consecutively with his undischarged sentence. 92 The
defendant was resentenced to serve his 1999 sentence and his undischarged sentence consecutively.93 The defendant claimed that he had
a legitimate expectation of finality of his sentences running concurrently and the resentencing enhanced his sentence and violated his
Double Jeopardy rights.94 The court rejected the defendant’s argument because the court did not enhance or lengthen his original sentence.95 The court held that “the Trial Court imposed the same sentence that, under New York law, it was deemed to have imposed at
his original sentencing.”96
In Warren v. Rock,97 the defendant’s original sentence did not
include the mandatory post-release supervision.98 When the court
discovered the error, it resentenced the defendant in order to correct
the sentence.99 The court held that although resentencing occurred
more than seven years after the original sentencing, it did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.100 The court reasoned that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits altering a previously imposed sentence
if the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in his original
sentence . . . but where no such expectation exists, [D]ouble
[J]eopardy does not bar a court from modifying a sentence.”101 The
court in Warren cited Williams for the proposition that “defendants
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
Id. at 723.
Id.
Id.
No. 12-CV-3101, 2012 WL 2421916 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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who have not yet completed their imposed sentences ‘cannot acquire
a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which is illegal, because such a sentence remains subject to modification.’ ”102 The
court found that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation
of finality in his illegal original sentence because at the time of resentencing when the post-release supervision was added he was still incarcerated.103 “[T]hus the re-sentencing to correct the sentencing
judge’s original oversight did not violate Warren’s double jeopardy
rights.”104
III.

STATE APPROACH

The New York Constitution states in Article 1, § 6, that “[n]o
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”105 Until 2010, when the New York Court of Appeals decided
Williams, New York courts followed the precedent established in
DiFrancesco to resolve the issue of Double Jeopardy in resentencing
cases.106 Since 2010, New York courts have followed the precedent
set forth in Williams to analyze expectation of finality for the purpose
of resentencing.107 The New York Court of Appeals believed the ruling in Williams “promotes clarity, certainty and fairness.”108
A.

New York Court of Appeals

In People v. Minaya,109 the defendant agreed to a plea bargain
of an eight year sentence for attempted robbery in the first degree.110
During sentencing, the court announced that it would follow the plea
bargain.111 However, when the sentence was pronounced, the court
stated that the defendant’s maximum term was three years instead of
102

Warren, 2012 WL 2421916, at *2.
Id.
104
Id.
105
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
106
See, e.g., People v. Minaya, 429 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (N.Y. 1981); Williams, 925 N.E.2d
at 888 (stating that the court in DiFrancesco “held that the protection against multiple punishments prevents a sentence from being increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality of the sentence.”).
107
See, e.g., Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 955-56; Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 146.
108
Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 956.
109
429 N.E.2d 1161 (N.Y. 1981).
110
Id. at 1162.
111
Id.
103
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eight years.112 The error was noticed when the prosecutor discussed
pleas with the codefendants.113 At an informal hearing, the court
concluded that the pronouncement of the three year sentence was erroneous and stated, “the sentence is now corrected.”114 The Appellate
Division reversed the correction on appeal and reinstated the three
year sentence.115 The decision noted that courts have the inherent
power to correct sentences; however, the defendant’s sentence in this
case was not correctable because the “imposition of judgment enlarging the time to be served by defendant is a matter of substance not
form.”116 The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and
stated that the court’s inherent power to correct statements or even
formal pronouncements permits the court to correct an error such as
the one in this case.117 The court held, “there is no basis for concluding that the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause posed any impediment to
the court’s power to correct the error in the sentence.”118
In People v. Sparber,119 there were five defendants: Sparber,
Thomas, Lingle, Rodriguez and Ware.120 Defendant Sparber pled
guilty to first degree assault for a fifteen year sentence and was adjudicated as a second violent felony offender.121 At sentencing, the
court pronounced the determinate term of fifteen years but did not
mention the mandatory five year post-release supervision term.122
Defendant Thomas was sentenced to a fifteen year aggregate term as
a second violent felony offender for aggravated assault on a police
officer and sex crimes involving a minor, but the court failed to pronounce post-release supervision at sentencing.123 Defendant Lingle
was sentenced to a determinate sentence of fourteen years as a second
violent felony offender for arson and an indeterminate sentence of
three and a half years to seven years to run concurrent with the de-

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Minaya, 429 N.E.2d at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164.
889 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 462.
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terminate sentence for reckless endangerment.124 At sentencing,
mandatory post-release supervision was not pronounced.125 Defendant Rodriguez was sentenced to the maximum of twenty five years
for gang assault in the first degree.126 The last defendant, Ware, was
sentenced to three determinate terms of fourteen years to run concurrently for attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted assault in
the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree, for which a term of post-release supervision was not imposed.127 In all five defendants’ cases, although the mandatory postrelease supervision term was not imposed at sentencing, it was included on the court worksheet.128 The court stated that the error of
the sentencing court “can be remedied through resentencing. Nothing
more is required.”129 The court recognized that notes on a worksheet
recorded outside of the defendants’ presence cannot satisfy the mandate of post-release supervision and errors can only be corrected
when the defendant was present.130 Additionally, the court found that
“the sole remedy for a procedural error as this is to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can
make the required pronouncement.”131 Thus, only a procedural error
is made when the required sentence is not pronounced, and it can easily be remedied by remitting the case back to the sentencing court in
order to pronounce the post-release supervision term.132
In 2010, Williams was decided by the New York Court of
Appeals. As previously stated, the defendants completed their determinate sentences, and they were released.133 Thereafter, they were
resentenced to impose post-release supervision terms.134 In Williams,
the New York Court of Appeals defined when a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality.135 The court held:
once a defendant is released from custody and returns
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 462-63.
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461, 463.
Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 886.
Id.
Id. at 891.
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to the community after serving the period of incarceration that was ordered by the sentencing court . . . there
is a legitimate expectation that the sentence, although
illegal under the Penal Law, is final and the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents a court from modifying the
sentence to include a period of post[-]release supervision.136
One year later, when Lingle was before of the New York
Court of Appeals, the court employed its holding in Williams to determine whether the defendants had a legitimate expectation of finality.137 The defendants served “substantial” portions of their originally
imposed sentences.138 The court held consistently with its decision in
Williams and rejected the defendants’ argument that completing a
“substantial” portion of their sentences was a basis for a legitimate
expectation of finality.139
B.

New York Appellate Division

In People v. Smith,140 the defendant was sentenced in 2000 to
determinate terms of eleven years for robbery in the second degree on
each of two counts, two years for grand larceny in the fourth degree,
and one year for criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth
degree, which were to run concurrently with each other.141 Postrelease supervision was not pronounced by the sentencing court.142
The defendant, while incarcerated in 2005, was sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to four years for promoting prison contraband
in the first degree, which was to run consecutively with his previous
sentences.143 Then, in 2010, the defendant was sentenced to another
one and a half to three years for promoting prison contraband, which
was to run consecutively with his other sentences.144 The defendant
was incarcerated for eleven years when he was resentenced for his

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 955-56.
Id. at 955.
Id.
955 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 14

1134

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

robbery in the second degree convictions to include a term of postrelease supervision.145 The court held that the resentencing did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.146 It used the reasoning from the
court in Williams stating “[s]ince the defendant was still serving this
single, combined sentence at the time of the resentencing, and had
not yet been released from prison, he did not have a legitimate expectation of finality.”147
Furthermore, in People v. Scott,148 the defendant was sentenced to determinate terms of ten years for attempted rape in the first
degree and seven years for assault in the second degree, which were
to run concurrently.149 However, the required post-release supervision was not imposed by the sentencing court.150 The court held that,
in accordance with the decision in Williams, resentencing the defendant to include the post-release supervision term did not put him in
Double Jeopardy because he had not been released from incarceration
of his original sentence.151
C.

New York Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of New York, Queens County faced the
issue of resentencing a defendant in order to impose the mandatory
post-release supervision to the original sentence in People v. Wells.152
The defendant was a second felony offender who was sentenced to
three determinate terms of ten years for one count of robbery in the
first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree, which
were to run concurrently.153 Additionally, the defendant was sentenced to indeterminate terms of three and a half to seven years for
criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree and one and
a half to three years for criminal possession of stolen property in the
fourth degree, which were to run concurrently, as well as a one year
determinate sentence for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.154
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Smith, 955 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 375.
917 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011).
Id. at 294.
Id.
Id.
903 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 704.
Id.
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When the defendant was originally sentenced, the court did not impose a term of post-release supervision for the determinate sentences.155 In October of 2009, the defendant was supposed to be resentenced.156 The defendant filed a motion opposing the resentencing
because he claimed that he had a legitimate expectation of finality
and resentencing to impose post-release supervision violated his
Double Jeopardy rights.157 The defendant was conditionally released
from incarceration in November of 2009, and his maximum expiration date would have been in April of 2011.158 In December of 2009,
the court denied the defendant’s motion and held that he “did not
have a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence” because “PRS [post-release supervision] is a mandatory component of
all determinate prison sentences, a sentence imposed without PRS
would be unauthorized [and] illegal; hence, a defendant could not
have a legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.”159
The court resentenced the defendant and imposed the post-release supervision term of five years.160 The defendant moved for the order to
be vacated.161
The court distinguished Wells from Williams.162 In Williams,
the defendants were beyond the maximum expiration dates of their
original sentences when they were resentenced; whereas, in this case,
the defendant was resentenced in December of 2009, and his maximum expiration date was not until April of 2011.163 The court stated
that there were no decisions from the Appellate Division regarding
imposition of post-release supervision on a defendant who was conditionally released from prison, served his initial sentence, completed
the direct appeal and the time for appeal has expired, but the maximum expiration date of the originally imposed sentence was not
reached.164 The court held, in accordance with the Williams decision,
that the defendant’s Double Jeopardy rights attached on the date in
which the defendant was conditionally released in November of
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Id.
Wells, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Wells, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
Id.
Id.
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2009.165 Thus, it was improper to resentence the defendant to impose
post-release supervision in December of 2009.166 The court reasoned
that the defendant was “entitled to the same constitutional rights as
other defendants whose maximum expiration dates have passed.”167
IV.

CONCLUSION

After evaluating the federal approach and the New York State
approach on resentencing under the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is
reasonable to conclude that the court in Brinson followed the proper
precedent when determining whether resentencing a defendant to impose a term of mandatory post-release supervision to the original illegal determinate sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Brinson was not a case of first impression. There
were several questions in which the court in Brinson looked to both
federal courts and state courts for answers. The Brinson case is important because the court sets out the precedent for resentencing defendants who were serving illegal determinate sentences that did not
include a period of post-release supervision in New York.
The defendants in Brinson were resentenced because the sentencing court failed to include a term of post-release supervision with
their original illegal determinate sentences.168 The court cited
Sparber as authority to conclude that when a required sentence is not
pronounced during sentencing, the error can be corrected by pronouncing it in the presence of the defendant at resentencing.169 The
court in Brinson also “presume[d] [the] defendants knew that their
determinate sentences were illegal, and that they knew they were subject to resentencing until such time as they completed their respective
sentences,” which was in accordance with Lingle.170 The court in this
case, unlike Williams, took into consideration that the originally imposed sentences were illegal and the defendants were presumed to
know of the illegality.171
Furthermore, the court in Brinson followed Richardson and

165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id.
Id. at 705-06.
Wells, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
Brinson, 995 N.E.2d 145.
Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 464-66.
Lingle, 949 N.E.2d at 955- 57.
Id.
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stated “courts have an inherent authority to correct illegal sentences.”172 Richardson cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Bozza for
their authority for correcting illegal sentences.173 Other courts have
continuously followed the precedent set in Bozza. The court in Henderson stated that correcting an illegal sentence by imposing a legal
one is not a multiple punishment for the same offense.174 The New
York Court of Appeals stayed consistent with the federal precedent in
Minaya. Even though the facts of Minaya are slightly different in
which the resentencing of the defendant increased his sentence, the
court still came to the same conclusion that the court’s power to correct an error does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.175
The final and most important issue in Brinson was whether
the defendants had a legitimate expectation of finality. The court
used Williams’ reasoning that a legitimate expectation of finality
cannot be achieved unless the defendant has completed the imposed
sentence.176 Many other courts have used this reasoning to determine
when a legitimate expectation of finality has been achieved. The Second Circuit answered the issue in King. The facts of King are analogous to Brinson and the courts both held the defendants would not
have a reasonable expectation of finality until they had completed
their determinate terms and had been released.177 Additionally, the
New York Appellate Division, in Smith and Scott, also ruled on the
issue of legitimate expectation of finality. The court’s holding in
Brinson was consistent with the holdings in Smith and Scott.178 These
cases establish that the courts consistently apply the same test to determine legitimate expectation consistently.
Even though the United States Supreme Court has not ruled
on whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality when
he or she is still serving the originally imposed illegal sentence, there
is consistency among the federal and the state courts. Ultimately, the
New York Court of Appeals decision in Brinson applied the proper
precedent and found the defendants’ Double Jeopardy rights were not
violated.
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 145-46.
Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-67.
Henderson, 474 F.2d at 513.
Minaya, 429 N.E.2d at 1162-64.
Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 145; King, 465 F. App’x at 45.
Brinson, 995 N.E.2d at 145; Smith, 955 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75; Scott, 917 N.Y.S.2d at

294.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 14

1138

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30
Deirdre Cicciaro



J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. 2011 in Business Administration, St. Joseph’s College. I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey Morris for
his considerate comments on this Note and my family for all of their love and support.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/14

18

